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PRIVATE DISPUTES AND THE PUBLIC GOOD:
EXPLAINING ARBITRATION LAW
WILLIAM W. PARK*
At least two intersecting questions lurk in any study of
international business arbitration. Each arises from the litigants'
desire (at least when the contract was signed) for binding dispute
resolution outside the framework of government-administered courts.
Each brings analytic challenges that implicate cross-cultural
conflicts.
The first question asks how arbitration is actually conducted. What
procedures help arbitrators determine facts, ascertain law and
interpret contract language? How does an arbitral tribunal strike an
optimal balance between efficiency and fairness for admission of
evidence, presentation of testimony and allocation of time?
The second line of inquiry explores arbitration's interaction with
society at large. When should the enforcement of awards be declined
in order to protect public interests? What subjects might be too
sensitive to entrust to arbitrators? What ethical standards should
govern arbitrators and counsel in cases involving several legal
systems?
What might be called the "micro study" of arbitration looks at the
first matter: design of tools to further efficient dispute resolution that
leaves the parties with a sense of having been treated fairly. Since
most institutional rules permit litigants and arbitrators to shape the
major contours of their proceedings, much of the arbitral process
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remains constantly in play. The civil procedure of international
arbitration is regularly being reinvented by practitioners (suggesting
novel ways to try cases), arbitrators (seeking equilibrium in
procedural rulings) and scholars (opining on good, bad and ugly
ways of doing things).
Arbitration's "macro study," by contrast, implicates the aggregate
social consequences of shifting litigation out of the public arena
(before national judges) into the private sector (before arbitrators).
Reliable enforcement of awards enhances international economic
cooperation by bolstering the vindication of contract rights through
neutral dispute resolution mechanisms, thus reducing the risks in
cross-border transactions.
Promoting efficiency, however, is not the only consideration in
arbitration law. Legislators and judges also seek to safeguard vital
community interests, such as regulation of markets and environment,
as well as the fair administration of justice. The tension between
these two concerns (reliable dispute resolution and the safeguard of
community interests) lies at the heart of what most arbitration law is
all about. These policy rivalries work themselves out in statutes,
treaties and judicial decisions.
None of this would matter much if the loser of an arbitration could
unilaterally elect to disregard the award. But such is not normally the
case. Arbitration proceeds in the shadow of judicial power.
When a recalcitrant party tries to renege on the bargained-for
obligation to arbitrate, courts are enlisted to seize assets and grant res
judicata effect to the arbitrator's decision.
The price of judicial support for arbitration includes respect for the
evolving outlines of national and international public policy, or ordre
public to use the Continental terminology. Sometimes these policy
concerns relate to whether the arbitral process itself is fair. In other
instances, attention might focus on how arbitration intersects with
government efforts to protect those members of society whose
welfare might be affected by private decision-makers.
The consequences of arbitration are usually more significant in an
international setting. If a Boston seller must sue a Georgia buyer in
Atlanta, the dispute will take place within a relatively homogeneous
linguistic and procedural context. Some variant of English will be
used, and the parties will normally be able to have their case heard in
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a federal court applying well-known procedural rules. By contrast, if
the buyer resides in Milano or Moscow, it might be necessary to
engage local counsel to litigate in the language of Dante or
Dostoyevsky, pursuant to an unfamiliar code of civil procedure. In
some countries, questions might even arise about judicial integrity.
As an alternative to national courts, arbitration permits a more
level litigation playing field. Rules of an impartial institution can be
applied by a relatively neutral tribunal convened in a mutually
accessible country. Proceedings can be held in a common language
according to rules that give neither side an undue advantage.
The fine group of articles contained in this symposium give a
glimpse into both the "micro" and the "macro" elements of
arbitration. The subjects covered include investor protection, money
laundering, conflicts of interest and the special problems of maritime
arbitration.
Professors Charles Brower and Jack Coe set the tone with a
dynamic exchange on investment arbitration, which they see as a
way to depoliticize investment disputes by moving them from a
"power-based" to a "rules-based" form of adjudication. Taking as his
template the well-known Mitsubishi case,1 Brower explores evolving
restrictions on investor-state arbitration. He reminds us that courts
enforce arbitration agreements and awards on the understanding that
arbitrators make "complimentary adjustments" to the way disputes
are decided. Mandatory national norms (such as competition law)
may displace the legal system stipulated in the parties' contract. To
some extent, arbitrators are expected to behave like judges in their
concern for the public interest. Brower elaborates his thesis with
parallels to the law of sovereign immunity.
Professor Coe grabs the ball and runs even farther, looking at the
balance between public and private interests through the lens of
recent changes in free trade agreements. He provides a first-rate
analysis of the trend toward greater constraints on how arbitrators
hear claims for investor protection. Arbitral tribunals are increasingly
hemmed in on several sides: "Notes of Interpretation," exchanges of
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
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diplomatic letters, and treaty appendices. In some instances
arbitrators may be subject to second guessing by appellate bodies.
Professor Catherine Rogers reminds us of the critical need for
ethical standards to guide those entrusted with resolution of
controversies arising from cross-border trade, finance and
investment. She addreses an evolving professional culture among
international arbitrators, as well as what might be called the "soft
law" of professional guidelines,2 often elaborated by organizations
such as the International Bar Association.
Andrew de Lotbini~re McDougall, a distinguished Canadian
advocate practicing in Paris, introduces readers to the particularly
vexing problem of arbitrations intended to disguise the criminal
origin of assets. In some instances, bogus disputes among related
parties are fabricated to produce an award that will sanitize money
obtained through bribery or smuggling. In other cases, arbitrators
may become aware of money laundering within the context of a
genuinely adversarial proceeding. In clear and comprehensive
fashion, Mr. McDougall examines the alternatives open to arbitrators
in such cases, including refusal of jurisdiction and invocation of
mandatory public norms.
Finally, Professor Fabrizio Marrella, who lectures in Venice and
Rome, brings a Continental perspective to maritime arbitration, a
richly variegated field that has been too often neglected in colloquia
addressing international arbitration. He explores both treaty
framework (such as the Montego Bay and Bruxelles conventions)
and non-treaty sources of authority in national admiralty laws, lex
mercatoria, and charter party agreements. Dr. Marrella brings to our
attention challenges related to the requirement of a writing and the
use of electronic communications.
It is hard to know who deserves the most congratulations for this
symposium: the authors who provide these superb scholarly
contributions, or the law review editors who cajoled and organized
the collection into existence. Either way, it was an enormous
pleasure to have had a preview of these stimulating articles.
2. See William W. Park, The Soft Law of International Arbitration, in
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(forthcoming 2005).
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